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Abstract
This paper presents Droplet, a decentralized data access con-
trol service, which operates without intermediate trust enti-
ties. Droplet enables data owners to securely and selectively
share their encrypted data while guaranteeing data confiden-
tiality against unauthorized parties. Droplet’s contribution
lies in coupling two key ideas: (i) a new cryptographically-
enforced access control scheme for encrypted data streams
that enables users to define fine-grained stream-specific ac-
cess policies, and (ii) a decentralized authorization service
that handles user-defined access policies. In this paper, we
present Droplet’s design, the reference implementation of
Droplet, and experimental results of three case-study apps
atop of Droplet: Fitbit activity tracker, Ava health tracker,
and ECOviz smart meter dashboard.
1 Introduction
The growing adoption of IoT has led to an ever-increasing
number of applications that collect sensitive user data. This
growth has come with mounting concerns over protecting the
data and the privacy of users. To date, the norm has been that
user data is collected and governed by application providers,
e.g., Fitbit. The problem with this status quo is that, be-
cause data lives in narrow and disjoint silos, it severely lim-
its a user’s ability to control access to her data, extract addi-
tional value from it, or otherwise move data across applica-
tions. This problem has led many – from both the technical
and non-technical communities – to call for new user-centric
models for IoT services, in which the storage of user data is
decoupled from the application logic, and control over access
to this data is in the hands of end users rather than service
providers [30, 70, 102, 105, 107].
However, if we are to realize this vision, we need system
designs that guarantee the security and privacy of user data
while at the same time ensure that users can securely, selec-
tively, and flexibly grant access to their data to third parties,
i.e., principals. Realizing such flexible yet secure access con-
trol is key if we are to extract insightful value of user data1,
e.g., drive large-scale analytics from IoT data.
Such access control must ideally provide the following
properties: (i) strong data confidentiality and integrity, with
cryptographic guarantees, accompanied with efficient cryp-
tographic operations. This is particularly essential in the con-
text of resource-constrained IoT devices and the high vol-
umes of time series data they generate. (ii) fine-grained ac-
cess control; specify who can access what part of a data
stream. (iii) no trusted intermediaries; systems today rely
heavily on trusted intermediaries, e.g., for delegated access,
making them trust bottlenecks. In addition to the above,
any solution must satisfy standard requirements for access
control, such as support for revocation and (optionally) au-
ditability.
No existing solution simultaneously provides all of the
above properties. The de-facto approach in deployments to-
day [9,34,53,74,95] assumes that the entity that enforces ac-
cess control – e.g., Fitbit or a storage provider – is within the
data owner’s trusted domain and consequently can see data in
the clear. However, this approach does not meet our goals of
user-centric control (since the provider controls data access);
in fact, as many have argued [33, 72, 89–92, 97, 102, 110],
this approach fails to provide even basic privacy since the
provider sees data in cleartext and consequently can share or
sell data without user authorization [38, 100].
The emerging alternative to the above approach is to en-
sure end-to-end encryption of data [47, 84, 102, 110]; here
data is encrypted at the user device and stored encrypted at
the storage provider; encryption/decryption is only executed
at authorized parties, without disclosing any secret keys to
the storage provider. This, however, introduces the challenge
of providing selective sharing of encrypted data. Solutions
adopted today for sharing [58, 64, 98] fall short in expres-
siveness (i.e., allowing fine-grained access policies), flexi-
bility (i.e., updates to access control), and usability (i.e., key
management and revocation). For instance, one approach
1Note that users can always delegate control to a third party provider just
like today - this is permissible, just not the de-facto model.
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is to encrypt data towards a principal’s public key; this suf-
fers from hard-coded access control [72] and is not scalable
for fine-grained access policies, specially when considering
high-volume and high-velocity data streams. Attribute-based
encryption [55, 104] is a promising alternative but yet pro-
hibitively expensive in the context of large volumes of time
series data (§4). Hence, existing approaches fail either in
terms of ensuring security/privacy or are too inefficient to be
practical.
The main question, and the focus of this paper, is then:
how do we enforce access control in this architecture? A
solution to access control has two parts: (i) data protection
(e.g., encrypting data such that a principal can only access
the authorized data segment), and (ii) authorization (e.g., ver-
ifying the identity of a principal and the access permissions).
The canonical authorization approach in today’s systems
is to use a standalone authorization service that is decou-
pled from data protection; i.e., a data owner registers the
authorized principals with an authorization service, such as
OAuth2 [74], which serves as a trusted intermediary to is-
sue and later verify access tokens for resources at a service
provider. Current authorization frameworks, besides suffer-
ing from several vulnerabilities [33, 102] have two key de-
sign problems that we address with this work. First, they
require users to put unlimited trust in the intermediaries run-
ning the services. Few companies dominate this space and
also learn about all services users interact. Trusted third par-
ties are, however, inherently prone to compromise [19], mis-
conduct [15,18,38], and collusion/corruption [106]. Second,
these schemes leave the enforcement of access control to the
service provider. Hence, they do not provide any assurance
about data access, as they are decoupled from the underly-
ing data protection. Consequently, users have no guaran-
tees that their data will not be shared against their will, nor
that the sharing relationship will remain private. Our sys-
tem, Droplet, resembles an authorization service; similar to
OAuth2, which does not suffer from these limitations.
In this paper, we devise a new system architecture and a
crypto-based data access scheme to address the above prob-
lems. Droplet builds on two insights; The first is that access
control and authorization need to be co-designed for end-to-
end encrypted systems. The second insight is that there is a
need for decentralized authorization services which operate
without relying on trusted intermediaries. Hence, we opt to
leverage blockchains; replicated state machines. In contrast
to traditional append-only distributed databases, blockchains
provide guarantees about the existence and status of a shared
state in an environment, where no single trusted intermediary
is in charge and control over data is not logically centralized.
While blockchains enable operation in a trustless environ-
ment, their use comes with challenges. Blockchains inher-
ently exhibit a high overhead and low capacity due to their
consensus protocols (i.e., narrow bandwidth). While read
operations are fast, chain-writes are inherently slow. The
key challenge is avoiding/bypassing these limitations. We
design Droplet such that we store the absolute minimum con-
trol metadata in the blockchain and outsource data streams
and metadata to off-chain storage, via indirections. We con-
struct the authorization service of Droplet by leveraging a
running blockchain to build a replicated access control state
machine. Any node can independently bootstrap the autho-
rization state in a decentralized manner and check the access
permissions.
To realize the crypto-based access control in Droplet; de-
vices encrypt their data before uploading it to remote stor-
age. Data owners register data streams and securely associate
privacy-preserving access permissions through Droplet’s au-
thorization service. Only authorized principals are crypto-
graphically able to access (decrypt) the intended data seg-
ments. We design a novel key distribution and management
scheme to enable efficient key updates and fine-grained yet
scalable sharing of both arbitrary temporal ranges and open-
ended streams. Our design builds on key regression and
hash trees via a layered encryption technique. Droplet can
(optionally) guarantee data integrity such that even the data
owner cannot alter data once uploaded. In summary, Droplet
ensures data owner’s sovereignty and ownership over their
data, such that they maintain the ultimate power to selec-
tively and flexibly share their data with desired parties.
With a prototype implementation2 of Droplet, we quantify
Droplet’s overhead and compare its performance to the state-
of-the-art systems. When deploying Droplet with Amazon’s
S3 as a storage layer, we experience a slowdown of only 3%
in request throughput compared to the vanilla S3. More-
over, we show the potential of Droplet as an authorization
service for the server-less computing domain with an AWS
Lambda-based prototype. We show Droplet’s performance is
within the range of the industry-standard protocol for autho-
rization (OAuth2). Also, we deploy Droplet with a decen-
tralized storage layer to give insights about its potential for
the emerging decentralized storage services [64, 98]. With
our example apps on top of Droplet, we show that real-world
applications with unaltered user-experience (i.e., perceived
delay) can be developed. In summary, the contributions of
this paper are:
• Droplet, the first decentralized authorization service that
enables secure sharing of encrypted data and works with-
out trusted intermediaries.
• a new crypto-enforced access control scheme that allows
flexible and fine-grained access to encrypted data streams.
• a design that couples authorization with crypto-enforced
access to mitigate the limitations of sharing in end-to-end
encryption (i.e., static policies) and current authorization
services (i.e., lack of cryptographic guarantees).
• an open-source prototype and evaluation of Droplet show-
ing its feasibility and competitive performance.
2Droplet is available under https://dropletchain.github.io/
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2 Background
Internet of Things Data. Today, IoT services control sen-
sitive data (e.g., health, home) with little or no transparency.
Enabling secure and transparent sharing and access to data
is crucial to the success of the IoT, as data in this space be-
comes most valuable when processed and fused by external
services (e.g., analytical). This is specially relevant for bilat-
eral data sharing (Droplet’s focus), which in contrast to mul-
tilateral sharing (e.g., crowd-sourcing, model training, statis-
tical datasets) cannot benefit from group privacy techniques
(e.g., differential privacy [42]). Time series data is deemed as
the most pervasive type of data in the IoT space [27, 31, 62].
It is a sequence of time-stamped data points, where time is
the primary axis. IoT data is predominantly characterized as
immutable time series data, i.e., append-only data records,
with a single writer who generates data and multiple read-
ers who consume data. Analytics over such data are often
centered around analyzing data within a specific time period
attributed to an event (e.g., vital body signs during running).
These insights have shaped the design of our crypto-enforced
access scheme that is innate to these characteristics (§5.1.1).
Blockchain. Blockchain is a replicated state machine,
with a consensus protocol as its foundation that forms agree-
ment over the sequence of updates to a shared state among
untrusted participants. The consensus protocol tackles the
Byzantine fault tolerance problem, where a given thresh-
old of malicious participants in the network can be toler-
ated. From a system’s point of view, a blockchain is a dis-
tributed append-only global log, without centralized control.
Logs are itemized within blocks which are cryptographically
chained together via hashes. As each new block contains a
hash to the last valid block, blocks form a tamper-evident
data structure. On top of the ordered logs, decentralized ap-
plication logic can be realized [3, 43].
Permissionless blockchains are open to unknown partici-
pants and typically run a Proof-of-Work (PoW) probabilistic
leader election algorithm [24], such as the Nakamoto con-
sensus [78]. Permissioned (closed) blockchains have a des-
ignated set of authorized validators and use a variant of the
practical Byzantine fault tolerance (PBFT) [29] consensus,
which tolerates a malicious behavior by f validators among
3 f + 1. PBFT can handle a higher transaction throughput
compared to PoW blockchains. Due to the high communica-
tion overhead of traditional PBFT (in O(n2)), only deploy-
ments with up to a few tens of validators are practical.
Blockchain Evolution. Permissionless blockchains have
to cope with a dynamic set of membership, where any-
one can join and leave at any time. Hence, they lever-
age the expensive PoW to mitigate Sybil attacks, which
induces high overhead regarding throughput, latency, and
energy footprint. To understand the extent of this over-
head, consider Bitcoin as an example; it has a through-
put of 7 transactions per second with an average latency
of 10 min and finality after 6 blocks [24]. Next-generation
blockchains [28, 45, 52, 68, 69, 77] promise higher through-
puts and lower latencies, which is crucial for the adoption
of blockchain-based systems in retail payments and finan-
cial sector, and for realizing large-scale decentralized appli-
cations. Recent works [68, 69] introduce a hybrid consensus
by combining the slow PoW to bootstrap the faster PBFT
algorithm, where for each epoch a random set of validators
is selected. Hence, they bring the best of both worlds: se-
cure open enrollment and high throughput and low latency.
These scalable blockchain protocols, e.g., OmniLedger [69],
lay the groundwork enabling practical advanced decentral-
ized services, such as Droplet. Blockchain research is mov-
ing at a fast pace to address associated security [51, 66, 68],
privacy [26,56,88], and scalability issues. Droplet can be de-
ployed on top of any blockchain that supports total ordering
of transactions, as elaborated in §5.1.3.
3 Security Model
Threat model. (i) Storage: the threat model addressed
by Droplet consists of an honest-but-curious (passive) adver-
sary, who is interested in learning about users data without
necessarily being noticed (i.e., it follows the protocol cor-
rectly). Our threat model covers malicious storage nodes,
potential real-world security vulnerabilities leading to data
leakages, and as well external adversaries who gain access
to data as a result of system compromise. We also con-
sider an adversary who coerces the storage provider to hand
out data without the owner’s consent. Moreover, an adver-
sary can launch a data scraping attack against storage nodes.
(ii) Access Permissions State: an adversary may access and
bootstrap the access control state machine, but it cannot alter
or learn sensitive information about the access permissions
(e.g., sharing relationships or keying material). For an ad-
versary to alter the access permission states, it needs to break
the security of the underlying blockchain. The general block-
chain threat model assumes that an adversary cannot control
a defined ratio of nodes in the network, for the blockchain
to be considered secure. The actual ratio depends on the
deployed consensus protocol by the underlying blockchain.
For instance, given n total blockchain nodes and f adversary
nodes, a ratio of n = 2 f + 1 for Nakamoto-style consensus
mechanisms [78] or n = 3 f +1 for PBFT consensus mecha-
nisms [13] is required for the honest majority.
Guarantees. Droplet embodies a decentralized encryption-
based access control mechanism that enable secure and se-
lective access to stream data within the above discussed
threat model. Data is encrypted at the client-side and keys
are never revealed to the storage provider, guaranteeing con-
fidentiality. Decryption keys are only shared with authorized
parties via a blockchain-based indirection. Data chunks are
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digitally signed, allowing parties without decryption keys to
verify data authenticity and integrity. Droplet enables check-
ing the freshness of data and it provides data immutability
optionally via an authenticated data structure anchored in
the blockchain, such that even the data owner can no longer
modify past data. Droplet cryptographically prevents evicted
users from accessing future data. Though evicted users may
have already cached past data, they are however prevented
from future access. Droplet encodes user-defined access per-
missions in the blockchain, eliminating trusted intermedi-
aries and assuring collusion-resistance and auditability. Even
malicious institutions cannot illegitimately modify access
permissions. Moreover, we employ privacy-preserving ac-
cess permissions, preventing an observer from learning the
identities of the sharing parties. Droplet does not protect
against denial-of-service attacks nor does it hide access pat-
terns. It could be extended with ORAM techniques to hide
access patterns [63, 96]. Cryptographic techniques alone are
not sufficient to prevent a malicious storage provider from
denial-of-service or deconstruction of data. Hence, adequate
replication strategies on multiple providers are necessary to
ensure preservation and availability of data.
Assumptions. In Droplet, we make the following assump-
tions. We assume the storage nodes to be honest-but-curious,
such that they follow the protocol correctly. This is a valid
assumption, since the storage node could face financial (and
potentially legal) consequences upon detection of misbehav-
ior. We assume the adversaries to be subject to the standard
cryptographic hardness and the underlying blockchain to be
secure, i.e., similar to previous work [3, 6, 17, 101], we as-
sume transactions are immutable after a confirmation period
and the blockchain network to be reliable. We assume users
store their keys securely and that key recovery techniques are
deployed (we discuss in §7.3 potential recovery techniques,
such as Shamir’s secret sharing). We assume data producers
to report correct data and to perform data serialization in-
cluding encryption correctly. We assume there is a financial
agreement between the storage provider and data owner to
provide persistent storage which can be facilitated through
the cryptocurrency feature of the underlying blockchain.
4 Related Work
Droplet’s main objective is to empower users with full con-
trol (ownership) over their data while ensuring data confiden-
tiality. We define data ownership as having the right and con-
trol over data, wherein the owner can define/restrict access,
restrict the scope of data utility (e.g., sharing aggregated/
homomorphically-encrypted data), delegate these privileges,
or give up ownership entirely without the need to rely on any
trusted entities to facilitate this. A true realization of this def-
inition requires work on two fronts: (i) privacy-preserving
computation (i.e., differential privacy and secure computa-
tion) and (ii) secure and privacy-preserving access control
of remotely stored data with strong confidentiality guaran-
tees. In this work, we focus on the latter, specifically in the
context of time series data. We briefly discuss limitations of
current solutions in facilitating ownership and make a case
for Droplet.
Crypto-enforced Data Access. End-to-end encryption pro-
vides the strongest level of protection for data stored in the
cloud, as data remains encrypted and only authorized enti-
ties are trusted with decryption keys. However, fine-grained
access and sharing of data is a challenge here. A simple ap-
proach to selective sharing of encrypted data is to encrypt
the target data segments towards the principal’s public key;
although simple this approach suffers from three drawbacks:
(i) hard-coded access control [72]; at encryption time the ac-
cess permission is defined and cannot subsequently be al-
tered or revoked, (ii) storage overhead; if the same data is
shared with multiple principals, the user ends up storing re-
dundant data as she needs to encrypt the same data under
each principal’s public key, and (iii) scalability and practi-
cality issues particularly when considering fine-grained ac-
cess policies. These drawbacks are pronounced with time
series data, where high volume of data is continuously pro-
duced and a high key-rotation is necessary to ensure flexible
control in encryption-based access control.
Various cryptographic schemes [8, 23] have been intro-
duced to overcome some of these challanges, among which
attribute-based encryption (ABE) [54, 55, 87, 102] offers the
best expressiveness. ABE encrypts data towards a policy
(i.e., associated with a set of attributes), and only principals
with the secret key satisfying the policy can decrypt the data.
Several ABE-based systems [102, 104] introduce crypto-
based access control for remote storage services. However,
ABE suffers from expensive crypto operations and the costs
grow linearly with the number of attributes, limiting the
granularity of access due to computational burdens [2, 50].
The overhead dominates even with a hybrid encryption tech-
nique [102, 104], where data is encrypted with fast encryp-
tion and only encryption keys are encrypted with the ex-
pensive ABE, e.g., only two attributes result in 100 ms for
enc/decryption on desktops and few seconds on low-power
IoT devices [103]. In Droplet, we opt to design an efficient
crypto-based data access mechanism that is tailored for the
velocity of data streams and supports scalable fine-grained
sharing (§5.1.1).
Distributed Authorization. Current distributed authoriza-
tion protocols, such as OAuth2 [74] and Macaroons [20] suf-
fer from several limitations, as already highlighted in §1.
Signature-based schemes (e.g., public-key certificates [21,
40]) require a centralized, hierarchical network of certifica-
tion authorities (CA) to issue certificates, which come with
their weaknesses [75]. Alternative public-key based ap-
proaches, e.g., SPKI/SDSI [40] and follow-up schemes [41],
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eliminate the need for complex X.509 public key infrastruc-
ture and CAs. However, these schemes are either based on
the idea of local names and suitable for deployments under
a single administrative domain (e.g., smart home) or build
upon an organically growing trust model [109]. While the
key idea of public-key-based schemes underpins Droplet, our
system neither suffers from certificate-chain discovery nor
requires a complex certificate infrastructure (§5.1.2).
Blockchain-based Systems. Decentralized blockchain-
based applications (i.e., without trusted intermediaries) be-
yond cryptocurrencies have gained more attention in re-
cent years. Example applications include; medical data ac-
cess [12], IoT device commissioning and management [59],
financial auditing [79], name and identity management [3],
software-update transparency and verifiability [82] and pre-
venting unauthorized certificate issuance [75]. Closest to our
work are; Enigma [110,111] which envisions a decentralized
personal data management and secure multi-party compu-
tation platform for multilateral sharing. They use a single
data encryption key among the sharing parties (i.e., no fine-
grained crypto-based access) and require blockchain trans-
actions for each read/write request (i.e., limited scalability).
Calypso [67] introduces on-chain secrets, with associated ac-
cess policies. A set of trustees collectively enforces the poli-
cies via threshold encryption and distributed key generation.
None of the above systems addresses the challenge of fine-
grained access control for encrypted time series data.
5 Droplet Design
Droplet in a Nutshell. At a high level, Droplet is a decen-
tralized access control system that enables users to securely
and selectively share their IoT data streams with principals.
Droplet’s design marries a novel crypto-enforced access con-
trol scheme tailored for time series data and a decentral-
ized authorization service. Our crypto-enforced access con-
trol scheme enables users to express flexible access control
policies (§5.1.1). Data is end-to-end encrypted yet can be
selectively shared and accessed with our crypto-based data
access scheme. The key idea behind our encryption-based
access control is to serialize time series data into chunks
where each chunk is encrypted with a unique encryption key.
This resembles a crypto-based access control, that allows ex-
pressing access policies at the chunk granularity. The chal-
lenge here becomes how to efficiently generate and manage
the large number of unique encryption keys and allow ex-
pressing access polices with a minimum shared state that is
then used to derive all decryption keys associated with the
access policy. To address this specific challenge, we intro-
duce a novel key management scheme (§5.1.1). Although
crypto-based access control is powerful it is not suffice by
itself, as it does not handle authorization and revocation ad-
equately. To address this issue, we introduce a decentralized
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Figure 1: Droplet’s system overview. Data is end-to-end en-
crypted with an encryption-based access control. The data
owner defines access permission policies and updates to the
access policies are logged in the blockchain. The storage
service validates access requests based on the user-defined
access permissions from its locally bootstrapped access con-
trol state machine.
authorization service (§5.1.2) that interplays with our crypto-
based access control scheme. Our decentralized authoriza-
tion in its essence is similar to OAuth2, however, we realize
the access control state machine on top of a running block-
chain (§5.1.3), to eliminate the need for trust intermediates
which OAuth2 realizations today heavily depend on. The
access control state machine assembles the current global
state (i.e., access permissions and data ownership) through
embedded private state transitions.
System Overview. As illustrated in Figure 1, our design
considers the following four actors: data owner is someone
who owns a set of IoT devices (e.g., wearables, appliances,
or apps) which produce time series data, i.e., data produc-
ers. In an industrial setting, the data owner can be an organi-
zation that owns a swarm of IoT devices. The generated data
is stored on remote storage services and data owners can de-
cide to selectively expose their data to data consumers (i.e.,
principals) who can produce an added value from the data
(e.g., fuse several streams for prediction tasks). Each prin-
cipal computes the corresponding decryption keys locally
based on an authorization token (i.e., embodies an access
policy state) shared through Droplet. Data owner, data pro-
ducer, and data consumer run Droplet’s client engine, which
covers the tasks of data serialization, enc/decryption, and key
management. The storage node is in charge of storing data
and providing access to principals as defined by the data
owner. The storage node grants or denies access requests
via Droplet’s decentralized authorization, i.e., in accordance
with user-defined access permissions. The storage node can
take various forms, such as edge, decentralized (e.g., a node
in a p2p storage service [64]), or cloud storage (e.g., Ama-
zon’s S3). The storage node runs Droplet’s storage engine
and can additionally run an instance of Droplet’s authoriza-
tion service to handle access requests locally. As a matter
of fact, anyone can run an instance of Droplet’s authoriza-
5
tion service to either expose it as a service or to monitor
the state of access permissions. The data owner and data
consumer run an instance of Droplet’s decentralized autho-
rization to set/adjust/monitor access permissions. Note that
Droplet’s decentralized authorization instances are stateless
and can selectively persist relevant access permissions for
fast lookup.
We now introduce and discuss different aspects of Droplet.
We begin with a simplified description of our system com-
ponents and gradually converge to the full system design.
5.1 Decentralized Access Control
In the following, we elaborate on our crypto-enforced data
access scheme. As the backbone of our crypto-based data ac-
cess, we present the design of an efficient key-management
scheme. Later, we discuss how we manage identities and
access permissions for authorization.
5.1.1 Crypto-enforced Data Access
There exist three common types of sharing modalities de-
sired for time series data, varying based on the role and pur-
pose of the data consumer; (i) subscription, where the data
consumer is granted continuous access to the data stream as
it is generated, either temporarily or until revoked, (e.g., a
visualization app rendering an overview of the user’s daily
activity based on wearable data), (ii) sharing arbitrary inter-
vals of past data (e.g., a practitioner app accessing and ana-
lyzing user’s health data during past pregnancy), and (iii) a
combination of i and ii. Droplet supports the above sharing
abstractions. To meet our design objective of realizing an ef-
ficient fine-grained yet scalable crypto-based access control,
we have to accommodate for resource-constraint IoT devices
(i.e., computationally limited [60]) and the large volume of
time series data (i.e., vast number of encryption keys).
At a high level, the cryptographic access control in Droplet
is based on hybrid encryption. Each data chunk of the data
stream is encrypted under a random symmetric key derived
from a hash tree. Encryption keys are time encoded and
mapped to the corresponding data chunk – we focus on time
series data with a stream nature, where data records are gen-
erated continuously and serialized using time-based chunk-
ing (§5.2). Keys are rotated for each chunk (i.e., epoch key
rotation) permitting access permissions at the chunk level.
Access policies represent tokens that a principal can use to
derive the necessary keys to decrypt data stream segments
that they are authorized to access. Note that data owners do
not need to define access policies prior to encryption, own-
ers can introduce new and different access polices for vari-
ous principals at any point of time during the stream lifes-
pan. Droplet allows flexible access policies for individual
data consumers, without the need of data re-encryption or
introducing redundant data.
Binary Hash Tree
time
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derived DEK
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shared nodes/tokens
t0 t3 t6 t7
Binary Hash Tree
time
DEK (Data Enc Key)
Dual key regression
SEK (Subscriber Enc Key)
Enc (DEKi)SEKi
t0 t3 t6 t7 t12 t15
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Figure 2: Droplet’s key generation is based on hash trees.
Data Encryption Keys (DEKs) are managed through the hash
tree, allowing efficient sharing of arbitrary intervals. The
shared nodes within the authorization token represent the ac-
cess policy. The principal computes the corresponding DEKs
locally from shared nodes.
The design of our cryptographic access control in its core
builds on hash trees [25] and key regression [49] to enable
expressing stream-specific access policies and efficient man-
agement of encryption keys. Both key regression and hash
tree support computing a large segment of keys from a sin-
gle shared state, instead of sharing individual keys. We con-
struct our system, such that the shared state maps to an access
policy. We discuss how by combining a hash tree and key re-
gression into a compound key management, we can define
expressive access policies for data streams. In the follow-
ing, we first describe Droplet’s overall key management and
the role of hash trees in our design. We then introduce dual
key regression which builds on the basic key regression to
support bounded interval sharing. As our key management
heavily relies on hash chains, we later discuss how to con-
struct compact chains for an efficient and fast key rotation.
Droplet’s Key Management. In the following, we intro-
duce the two key components of Droplet’s key management.
We later describe how they come together to create a hybrid
key management scheme. We start by describing the role
of binary hash trees (BHT) in our system. A BHT is con-
structed top-down using two cryptographic hash functions
for the left - hashl(), and right - hashr() child nodes. Initially
the hash functions are applied to the root node - a secret seed.
Afterwards they are successively applied to the left and right
outputs (i.e., parent serves as input to the corresponding hash
functions to compute the left and right child nodes). BHTs
are similar to hash chains in that due to the preimage resis-
tance of cryptographic hash functions, it is computationally
intractable to find the parent of a given child node, while the
reverse is efficiently computable.
For Droplet’s key management, we construct a hash tree of
depth d. The leaf nodes deliver the data encryption keys (i.e.,
via a key derivation function), as depicted in Figure 2. The
encryption keys are time-encoded such that each key maps
to a well-defined time interval, during which a data chunk
is generated. To share any arbitrary interval, the data owner
just shares the inner nodes in the BHT necessary to com-
pute the corresponding keys. For instance, in Figure 2, given
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the two highlighted inner nodes a data consumer is granted
access to two disjoint intervals t[0−3] and t[6−7], and can com-
pute the corresponding decryption keys. Our construction
so far, while consistent with our efficiency and low over-
head requirements, lacks support for sharing in subscription
mode, where data consumers have continuous access to data
streams. Realizing this mode of sharing with BHT requires
maintaining and sharing a growing state per data consumer.
To overcome this challenge, we combine BHT with dual
key regression via a layered encryption technique. Dual key
regression resembles a linear chain of keys, where given a
constant state, i.e., beginning and end indices, one can com-
pute all the keys in between, as described in the next sec-
tion. Conceptually, we exploit the hash tree to allow arbitrary
sharing of intervals and the dual key regression to support
sharing in subscription mode. The layered encryption con-
sists of two steps: (i) the hash tree delivers time-encoded data
encryption keys DEKi which we use to encrypt data gener-
ated during the time epoch i. (ii) the dual key regression
delivers also time-encoded subscriber encryption keys SEKi
for the epoch i. We use SEKi to encapsulate the correspond-
ing data encryption key: ENCSEKi(DEKi). For fast access,
each encrypted data chunk holds the encapsulated DEK.
With this construction, we can give access to data encryp-
tion keys either via the hash tree (arbitrary intervals) or dual
key regression (subscription), as depicted in Figure 3. To
a subscriber, DEKs appear as random encryption keys per
epoch. For principals with access to past data, DEKs are the
leaf nodes of the BHT which they locally compute based on
the shared inner nodes (e.g., root nodes of the correspond-
ing subtrees). Note that a principal can be granted access
in both modes simultaneously, as illustrated in the example
of Figure 3. In this example, the data owner has granted
the principal access to the intervals t[0−3] and t[6−7], where
access to the corresponding data encryption keys is realized
through the hash tree. Additionally, the principal is granted a
subscription from t12 which is realized over dual key regres-
sion.
Dual Key Regression. The concept of key regression [49]
relies on hash chains. Given a single hash token, one can
derive all previous keys by applying the hash function suc-
cessively. However, no future keys can be computed (i.e.,
forward-secrecy). More specifically, given key Kt in time
t one can compute all keys until the initial key K0, i.e.,
∀i∈[0..t]Ki. This is not always desirable, since key regression
enables sharing of all keys from the beginning until current
time (i.e., all-or-none principle). Hence, we design a key
management mechanism that enables sharing with a defined
lower time bound, e.g., access to data of a particular stream
from Jan’18 till revoked. To realize this, we extend key re-
gression with an additional hash chain in the reverse order,
to cryptographically enforce both boundaries of the shared
interval (Figure 4). In key regression, hash tokens are con-
Binary Hash Tree
time
DEK (Data Encryption Key)
derived DEK
KDF
hash functions
shared nodes/tokens
t0 t3 t6 t7
Binary Hash Tree
time
DEK (Data Enc Key)
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SEK (Subscriber Enc Key)
Enc (DEKi)SEKi
t0 t3 t6 t7 t12 t15
derived DEK
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Figure 3: Droplet’s hybrid key management system supports
sharing of both arbitrary intervals (hash tree) and subscrip-
tions (dual key regression). Given the start and and end to-
kens within the dual key regression, the principal can com-
pute the Data Encryption Keys (DEKs) within this interval
locally, e.g., between t12 and t15 in this example.
sumed in the reverse order of chain generation as input to a
key derivation function to derive the current key. Due to the
pre-image resistance property of hash functions, it is com-
putationally hard to compute future tokens and hence future
keys. However, the reverse can be computed efficiently. We
leverage this property of hash chains for defining the begin-
ning of an interval through a secondary hash chain in the
reverse order, as depicted in Figure 4.
In dual key regression, the KDF takes a second token h′i:
KDF(hi||h′i) = Ki, with h′i from the secondary hash chain
(Figure 4). For instance, to share a data stream from time
ti to t j, the user provides the tokens h′i and h j. Since it is in-
feasible to compute h j+1, no key posterior to k j can be com-
puted. Conversely, since it is infeasible to compute h′i−1, no
key prior to ki can be computed. With access to the two hash
tokens (h j, h′i), indicating the beginning and end of the shared
interval, one can compute all the encryption keys within this
interval.
Key Distribution. An important aspect to address in
crypto-based access control schemes is how to efficiently
distribute keys, in our system this is specially tricky for the
subscription mode, where new data chunks are arriving con-
tinuously and each one is encrypted with a new key. We now
describe our key distribution mechanism and refer to §5.1.2
for insights on obtaining the keying material over the decen-
tralized authorization service storage network. When a new
data consumer is added, an authorization token resembling
the defined access policies is issued which contains either
(i) the state to compute decryption keys for past data intervals
(i.e., inner nodes of the hash tree) or (ii) in case of sharing in
the subscription mode the hash token for the start of the inter-
val h′i (i.e., dual key regression). For the subscription mode
the challenge is to give the active set of subscribers continu-
ous access to the latest token (i.e., ht from the main chain),
such that they can compute the current decryption key. If we
were to encrypt the current hash token for each subscriber
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Figure 4: Our dual key regression supports time-bounded
sharing, via a secondary hash chain. Standard key regression
is in gray. The gray elements depict the traditional hash-
based key regression mechanism: Given current kc, one can
compute all keys up to k0. Our scheme allows the sharing of
keys for an interval via a secondary hash chain.
individually, this would incur communication/computation
overheads in O(s), given s subscribers.
To reduce this overhead, we distribute the latest dual key
regression token ht within a digitally signed and encrypted
lockbox. Authorized subscribers obtain the long-term dis-
tribution key KD to open the lockbox. Note that lockbox
encryption is significantly more efficient than per subscriber
encryption. When sharing access to a data stream, we share
the distribution key encrypted for the new subscriber through
the authorization service (§5.1.2). While data encryption
keys and hence dual key regression tokens are frequently up-
dated at a defined interval, the distribution key is only up-
dated after an access revocation event, as detailed next.
A subscriber decrypts the current data encryption key
ENCSEK j+1(DEK j+1) given the current token h j+1 and start
token h′i as:
KDF(h j+1||h′j+1) = SEK j+1,with H( j−i+1)(h′i) = h′j+1 (1)
with H as a hash function. The secondary token is stored
along the long-term per principal key information (§5.1.2).
Revocation. To revoke data stream access, the data owner
updates the distribution key (i.e., crypto-based access) and
issues a state update transaction (i.e., authorization) to evict
the revoked service. The transaction includes a new distribu-
tion key KD′ contained in the encrypted key information per
subscriber. Hereafter, the new data encryption key is only
available to the remaining authorized subscribers, protected
with the new distribution key.
With the newly issued transaction, the global access per-
mission state is updated (§5.1.2). In our access control
model, Droplet cryptographically prevents any future access
to new data by the evicted subscriber. Any future access re-
quests by the evicted subscriber to old data are declined dur-
ing authorization. However, we cannot prevent access to data
that the user has already cached or stored locally.
Compact Hash Chains. Our key management, specifi-
cally dual key regression, relies heavily on hash chains. The
underlying chains can grow quickly due to frequent key up-
dates. Due to memory-constraints of IoT devices, a combi-
nation of re-computing on demand and storing a segment of
the hash chain is desirable, to achieve fast and efficient key
rotations. We leverage hierarchical hash chains [61] which
maintain the same security features as traditional hash chains
but reduce the worst case compute time to O(
√
n). In our
evaluation discussions in §7.1, we show how compact chains
allow for a two-orders of magnitude key rotation speed-up.
5.1.2 Decentralized Authorization Service
So far, we covered Droplet’s crypto-based access control
mechanism. Now we describe Droplet’s authorization ser-
vice which handles access permissions. At a high level,
through Droplet’s exposed API, users can view their data
streams, the associated sharing policies, and storage infor-
mation, and can set/edit access permissions accordingly.
Similar to today’s authorization frameworks, e.g., OAuth,
our authorization service acts on behalf of users, forgoing
direct interaction of individual services with the data owner.
Storage providers query Droplet’s authorization service di-
rectly to validate access requests. Moreover, principals query
the authorization service to get their authorization token for
computing decryption keys.
In our design, we employ a publicly verifiable blockchain
to maintain an accountable distributed access control system
without a central trusted entity. The reasons why we opt
to design an authorization service that requires no trusted
intermediaries and instead utilizes blockchain are manifold:
(i) resilience against vulnerabilities of trusted intermediaries,
(ii) identity management, specifically of relevance to the IoT,
(iii) transparent audibility of access permissions by autho-
rized parties, (iv) immutability of data streams after a defined
interval, (vi) potential of nano-payments for storage services
and data market.
Droplet embeds ownership of data streams and corre-
sponding access permissions in the blockchain transactions.
We now describe the owner-device pairing, blockchain en-
coded access permissions, and how we protect the privacy of
principals.
Owner-Device Pairing. The blockchain ecosystem relies
on public key cryptography for identification and authenti-
cation of the involved principals. The hash digest of the pub-
lic key serves as a unique pseudo-identity in the network.
We leverage this feature to allow IoT devices to securely and
autonomously interact with the storage service. This way
we overcome the hurdle of passwords and rely on public-key
crypto for authentication and authorization. During the boot-
strap phase of a new device, it creates a pair of public-private
keys locally, where the private key is stored securely (e.g., in
the trusted hardware) and never leaves the device. Through
an initial two-way multisignature registration transaction on
the blockchain, Droplet allows the binding of the IoT device
(PKIoT , SKIoT ) to the owner (PKOw, SKOw). Henceforth, the
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Figure 5: Droplet’s authorization service verifies the ac-
cess control state machine based on embedded access con-
trol state transitions into blockchain transactions. The access
control state machine (consolidated into the AC DB) is boot-
strapped based on the state transitions and the accompanied
off-chain access control lists (the off-chain storage is not de-
picted for simplification).
owner can set access permissions (via the signing key SKOw)
and the IoT device is permitted to securely store data (via
the signing key SKIoT ). The necessary keying material for
encryption (§5.1.1) on the data producer is also exchanged
during the initial phase. Note that the data owner’s signing
key is powerful in that it sets/updates access permissions.
Hence, a key recovery mechanism must be in place for han-
dling a potential key loss (see §7.3).
In the event of device decommissioning, the new owner
must issue a new multisignature device-binding transaction,
to gain ownership of future data. Note that there is no need
for the IoT device to interact with the blockchain network di-
rectly. The owner creates the raw multisignature registration
transaction and uses an out-of-band channel (e.g., Bluetooth
Low Energy) to get the device’s signature. After adding her
signature, she broadcasts the register transaction to the net-
work. During this process, neither the owner’s nor the de-
vice’s private keys leave the secure local memory area.
Access Permissions. We utilize the blockchain to store ac-
cess permissions in a secure, tamperproof, and time-ordered
manner. Access permissions are granted per data stream.
Initially, the data owner issues a transaction including the
stream ID which creates the initial state. To change this state,
e.g., grant read access permissions to a principal, the data
owner issues a subsequent transaction which holds, among
others, (i) the stream ID, (ii) the public key of the principal
they want to share their data with, (iii) the temporal scope of
access (e.g., intervals of past or open-end subscription), and
(iv) encrypted keying material for data decryption (§5.1.1).
Note that for public key discovery of principals decentral-
ized identity management solutions, such as Keybase [65],
can be leveraged. Such solutions serve as a key directory
that maps online identities (e.g., Twitter, Github, Facebook)
to public keys in a publicly auditable manner.
For any request to store or retrieve data, storage nodes
query their instance of Droplet’s authorization service
(§5.1.3) for the corresponding access permissions, as illus-
trated in Figure 5. To enforce the permissions, the stor-
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Figure 6: Overview of access control transactions. Transac-
tions embed transitions to the global access control state via
an indirection (i.e., hash to the Access Control List). The
ACL is stored off-chain.
age node verifies the identity of the requesting user via a
signature-based authentication [32]. Data owners express
and dynamically adjust permissions through Droplet which
interacts only with the underling blockchain and not with
individual services. The authorization service addition-
ally protects storage nodes’ network resources (i.e., band-
width/memory) from unauthorized users. For instance, this
mitigates an attack, where malicious parties flood the net-
work with download/storage requests of large files. The stor-
age node can terminate malicious sessions (e.g., data scrap-
ing and storage spamming attacks) after checking the access
permissions (§5.1.3). Droplet supports auditing of access
permissions by authorized entities, as we explain in the next
section.
Privacy-Preserving Sharing. In public blockchains,
users are represented through virtual addresses, providing
pseudonymity. However, advanced clustering heuristics can
potentially lead to the de-anonymization of users [5,76]. Ac-
cess permissions in Droplet should be enforceable by storage
nodes (i.e., verify authorization) and be auditable by autho-
rized parties. However, we want to protect the privacy of
sharing relationships from the public. To realize this, we
leverage dual-key stealth addresses. Stealth addresses [37]
do not require off-blockchain communication (i.e., no out-
of-band channel) and provide strong anonymity for the prin-
cipals that are granted access permissions. Moreover, differ-
ent streams shared with the same principal are unlinkable.
Conceptually, each principal is represented by two public
keys (main and viewer keys: PKm, SKm, PKv, SKv), which
are used by other parties to generate a new unlinkable ad-
dress PKnew. The viewer private key SKv can be shared with
an auditor to audit the permissions. However, access to both
main and viewer private keys is required for data access, i.e.,
SKm and SKv are needed to compute SKnew, of which only
the principal is capable.
ACL Indirections. Blockchain storage is scarce and ex-
pensive, as it is replicated and maintained by the blockchain
network. This entails placing only the minimum necessary
logic in the blockchain. To keep the number and more impor-
tantly size of transactions as low as possible, our design in-
corporates off-chain storage of the access control list (ACL),
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as illustrated in Figure 6. The transaction, instead of hold-
ing the address information of all services, just includes an
indirection to the ACL via the hash digest of it. This allows
managing access permissions with an unlimited number of
services in a single transaction. Besides, the ACL can now
contain advanced access control logic (e.g., XACML [4]),
such as access groups and delegating parties. Any change to
the ACL requires a new transaction. The hash digest serves
as a data pointer and more importantly ensures integrity pro-
tection of the ACL. The ACL is stored off-chain either in the
P2P storage network of Droplet (§5.1.3) or alternative stor-
age services. The time until an access permission change
comes into effect is tied to the transaction confirmation time
of the underlying blockchain, ranging from few seconds to
minutes depending on the blockchain.
5.1.3 Access Control State Machine
Today, there are two main options developers can take for re-
alizing decentralized applications that employ a blockchain
as a ubiquitous trust network (i.e., a shared ground truth):
(i) operating a new blockchain, or (ii) embedding the ap-
plication logic into an existing secure blockchain deploy-
ment [80, 101]. We opt for the latter where we embed our
logic without alternation of the underlying blockchain. This
allows us to benefit from the security properties of an ex-
isting blockchain and make our design generic. We briefly
discuss the reasons why we opt for this choice and detail on
how we realize this efficiently.
Integrating a new application logic into a running block-
chain typically results in consensus-breaking changes and
hard forks [3], i.e., a new blockchain with only a subset of
peers enforcing the new logic. While necessary for specific
applications, this results in parallel blockchains which may
not exhibit strong security properties due to a smaller net-
work of peers. To benefit from security properties of a strong
and robust blockchain, new applications can embed their log
of state changes in transactions [3]. This is in turn used to
bootstrap the global state in a secure and decentralized man-
ner.
We employ the approach of virtualchain [3, 80] which
allows us to embed Droplet’s logic efficiently. A virtu-
alchain is a fork*-consistent replicated state machine, allow-
ing a different application logic to run on top of any pro-
duction blockchain, without breaking the consensus. While
the combination of virtualchain and blockchain is compa-
rable to Ethereum with its built-in scripting language, we
explicitly decide to make our design independent of a spe-
cific blockchain, such that Droplet can be deployed on the
most secure and efficient blockchain of choice. The vir-
tualchain instance in Droplet creates a global state of ac-
cess permissions based on the blockchain’s totally-ordered
and tamper-resistant transaction logs and updates the state
according to new state transitions. A virtualchain instance
essentially scans the blockchain for the corresponding ac-
cess permission transactions and maintains the global state
in a database that can be queried for access permissions of
a given data stream and principal. The virtualchain [3] in-
corporates several technical solutions that make maintain-
ing the global state efficient and fast, such as automatic
fork-resolution, cross-chain migration, and fast bootstrap via
checkpointing and skip lists. Droplet’s decentralized autho-
rization instance is realized employing virtualchains, which
anyone can run, either as a storage node to lookup access
permissions or just to provide it as a service. Droplet’s virtu-
alchain instances span among each other a peer-to-peer stor-
age network, which we employ to store part of access control
metadata, e.g., ACL and keying material. Note that since the
integrity of the off-chain metadata is protected via the block-
chain, they can also be stored on the data storage.
5.2 Data Serialization
Droplet focuses on time series data with a stream nature,
where data records are generated continuously, as depicted in
Figure 7. In Droplet’s data model, a data stream is divided in
chunks of predefined time intervals; chunking and batching
are common techniques for time series data [48,57,71,108].
Instead of storing individual data records, we store data
chunks, which are an ordered batch of data records of an
arbitrary type (i.e., pairs of timestamp/value). Although
chunking prevents random access at the record level, it re-
sults into a positive performance gain for data retrieval since
in time series data most queries require access to temporally
co-located data [57, 108]. E.g., data analytic apps work with
temporal data records (e.g., all records of a day).
Encryption. Each data chunk is initially compressed and
then encrypted at the source with an efficient symmetric ci-
pher. We rely on AES-GCM, as an authenticated encryption
scheme. Note that NIST bounds the use of AES-GCM to
232 encryptions for a given key/nonce pair. Due to our fre-
quent key rotations, we stay far below this threshold. The
chunks have a metadata segment containing, among others,
the chunk identifier, the owner’s address, hashes to previous
chunks (§5.2), and the stream identifier. The data field con-
tains the encrypted and compressed data records. Services
with access to the encryption key can verify the integrity of
the chunk and perform an authenticated decryption. To en-
sure data ownership, for instance towards the storage node,
each chunk is also digitally signed. This allows parties with-
out access to the encryption key to still be able to verify
the owner of the data stream, albeit at a higher computa-
tion cost. In general, digital signature operations are three
orders of magnitude slower than symmetric key operations,
as discussed in §7.1.
Storage Interface. The storage nodes in Droplet expose a
key-value interface, with a common store/get interface with
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Figure 7: Data streams chunked at defined temporal inter-
vals, and cryptographically linked together. To lookup a
record, the timestamp of the record is mapped to the chunk
identifier.
various flavors of get, such as getAll or getRange. For each
incoming request, the storage node first verifies the iden-
tity of the client (i.e., authentication) and looks up the cor-
responding access permissions regarding the client’s iden-
tity (i.e., authorization). Each request, is accompanied with
a universally unique identifier (UUID), defined as the hash
of the tuple: <owner address, streamID, counter>,
where streamID is a unique identifier of an owner’s data
stream. Traditional indexing for data retrieval cannot be ap-
plied here as data chunks are encrypted. Hence, we need to
devise a mechanism to perform temporal range queries over
encrypted data efficiently. To avoid consistency issues of a
shared index, we exploit a simple local lookup mechanism
to enable temporal range queries. For a constant lookup time
of a record with timestamp ti, we compute the counter of the
chunk holding it based on the known time interval ∆ of the
chunks: b(ti− t0)/∆c. For instance, we can map the lookup
of value 7 in Figure 7 to the identifier of chunk #1. The
chunk metadata is included in the initial stream registering
transaction, as depicted in Figure 6. Note that the chunk
metadata additionally enables freshness checks for chunks,
since the chunk interval indicates the frequency and time at
which new data chunks are generated.
Strong Data Immutability. While Droplet provides in-
tegrity protection via authenticated encryption and digital
signatures, the data owner can still modify old data. Specific
applications might require a stronger notion of immutability
such that even the data owner can no longer modify the data
(e.g., contractual agreements in logistics). Droplet enables
such notion of immutability through blockchain’s append-
only property [24]. The application developer can define
a grace period after which data chunks become immutable.
For sensitive applications, this can be per chunk. Otherwise,
a longer period can be selected. To accommodate for the
narrow bandwidth of blockchains, we leverage an anchor-
ing technique, where data immutability transactions are re-
duced to the level of the grace period. To realize this, the
first data chunk holds a pointer to the registration transac-
tion and after the grace period a transaction with a pointer
to the latest chunk is issued, as depicted in Figure 8. Since
all data chunks are cryptographically linked via hashes, all
data chunks in the grace period become immutable at once,
forming a chain of data chunks. To avoid a linear verifica-
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Figure 8: Immutable chunks after a defined grace period, i.e.,
t1−t0. Chunks are cryptographically linked together forming
a geometric series, enabling faster integrity checks.
tion time, chunks hold hashes to several previous chunks,
forming a geometric series. This enables a logarithmic veri-
fication time.
5.3 Privacy and Security Analysis
Authorization. For an adversary to alter access permis-
sions in the blockchain, it requires forging a digital signature
(i.e., breaking public key cryptography with 128-bit security
level) or gaining control over the majority of the comput-
ing power in the blockchain network. Existing production
blockchains, such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, can be subject to
security attacks, such as routing [7] and selfish mining [46],
which can lead to access permission state update transactions
to be dropped, delayed, or excluded.
An adversary is not capable of learning sensitive infor-
mation from the public blockchain, since only unlinkable
pseudo-identities and stream identifiers are stored. In pro-
filing attacks, the adversary creates profiles of all user iden-
tifiers and the network of users [76]. An adversary can break
the pseudonymity of specific users. Hence, a large body of
research aims at concealing identity and relationships in pub-
lic blockchains while maintaining verifiability [26, 56, 88].
Droplet currently employs dual-key stealth addresses, where
the anonymity set is equal to the set of users using nonspend-
able stealth addresses. A malicious storage node could hand
out data without permission or data leakage might take place
due to system compromise. However, the impact of this ac-
tion is limited since data is end-to-end encrypted. The block-
chain provides auditable information about when a stream
was shared with whom; a crucial piece of information to
prove or disprove access right violations should the need
arise.
Data Serialization. Data chunks are encrypted, integrity
protected, and authenticated. Any data chunk manipulations
are detectable with the digital signature and authenticated en-
cryption. The optional data immutability is based on the se-
curity and immutability of blockchain. The secure channel
(i.e., TLS) for storing and fetching data prevents replay at-
tacks, in addition to ensuring an authenticated and confiden-
tial channel. An adversary with access to disclosed encryp-
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AES Encrypt SHA Hash ECDSA Sign
[µs] [op/s] [µs] [op/s] [ms] [op/s]
IoT SW 298 3.4k 297 3.4k 270 3.7
IoT HW 42 23.8k 17 58.8k 174 5.7
Phone 50 20k 45 22.2k 4.4 227
Laptop 5.4 185k 1.6 623k 1.3 770
Cloud 2.6 384k 1.2 833k 1.1 909
Table 1: Performance of security operations with 128-
bit security on different platforms (i.e., AES256, SHA256,
ECDSA256). The IoT is represented by OpenMote micro-
controllers with software (SW) computations or crypto hard-
ware accelerator (HW). For smartphone, we use a Nexus 5
and for Laptop we use Macbook Pro. The cloud is repre-
sented by an Amazon t2.micro instance.
tion keys cannot alter old data, as it requires access to the
signing private key (in case additional immutability is not
enabled).
6 Implementation
Our reference implementation of Droplet is composed of
three entities implemented in Python: the client engine, the
storage-node engine, and the virtualchain. Droplet’s client
engine is in charge of composing a data stream and data seri-
alization. It handles viewing, setting, and modifying access
permissions. It provides the interface to interact with the
storage layer. The client engine is implemented in 1700 sloc.
We utilize Pythons’s cryptography library [85] for our
crypto functions. For compression, we use Lepton [39] for
images and zlib [35] for all other value types.
The storage engine can either run on the cloud or nodes of
a p2p storage network. Currently, we have integrated drivers
for Amazon’s S3 storage service. On individual nodes, we
employ LevelDB, an efficient key-value database [73]. We
have as well a realization of Droplet with a serverless com-
puting platform with ASW Lambda serving as the interface
to the storage (i.e., S3). Once Lambda is invoked, it per-
forms a lookup in the access control state machine to process
the authorization request. For comparison, we implement as
well an OAuth2 authorization, based on AWS Cognito [10].
For the distributed storage, we build a DHT-based storage
network. We instantiate a Kademlia library [86] and extend
it with the security features of S/Kademlia [14]. The Kadem-
lia protocol runs an asynchronous JSON/RPC over UDP. Our
extensions amount to 2400 sloc.
The virtualchain is instantiated from Blockstack [22] and
extended to implement our access control state machine. The
virtualchain scans the blockchain, filters relevant transac-
tions, validates the encoded operations, and applies the out-
come to the global state. The state is persisted in an SQLite
database. The global state can either be queried through a
REST API or accessed directly through the SQLite database.
Our extensions to the virtualchain amount to 1400 sloc. As
the underlying blockchain, we employ a Bitcoin test-network
with a low block generation time to emulate a hybrid consen-
sus blockchain [69] (i.e., ca. 15 s block confirmation).
7 Evaluation
We now discuss the micro-benchmark evaluation of Droplet
functionalities and then present the overall system perfor-
mance in the end-to-end evaluation. We present the per-
formance of Droplet on top of centralized and decentral-
ized storage layers, i.e., Amazon’s S3 and 1024 DHT nodes
running in real time on an emulated network. Evaluating
and prototyping Droplet within a decentralized storage set-
ting is an interesting case, as peer-to-peer storage networks
could become a viable solution for the IoT [107]. Addition-
ally, this setup resembles storage-oriented blockchains (e.g.,
Storj [99], Filecoin [98]), which still lack adequate mecha-
nisms for secure data sharing, where Droplet can be helpful.
We additionally evaluate the performance of Droplet in a
serverless setting and compare it to OAuth2 authorization.
Emerging serverless platforms such as Lambda [11], require
request-level authorization [1]. Hence, this is particularly an
insightful setting as Droplet serves as an independent Autho-
rization as a Service, which can be particularly useful to the
Function as a Service (FaaS) paradigm.
Setup. The serverless setup is composed of Lambda, S3
storage, and AWS Cognito in case of the OAuth2 base-
line benchmark. Our setup for the decentralized storage
consists of a memory-optimized instance of Amazon’s EC2
(r3.4xlarge, 122 GiB, 16 vCPU), where we run up to 1024
instances of storage nodes. We use netem [81] to emulate
a network roundtrip time of 20 ms between storage node in-
stances. We use one instance of Amazon’s S3 storage service
(20 ms latency) for the centralized storage scenario. For the
crypto operations, we use four classes of devices: (i) IoT:
OpenMotes are equipped with 32-bit ARM Cortex-M3 SoC
at 32 MHz, with a public-key crypto accelerator running up
to 250 MHz. Fitbit trackers utilize a similar class of mi-
crocontrollers; (ii) smartphone: LG Nexus5 equipped with
a 2.3 GHz quad-core 64-bit CPU and 2 GiB RAM; (iii) lap-
top: MacBook Pro equipped with 2.2 GHz Intel i7 and 8 GiB
RAM; (iv) Cloud: EC2 t2.micro (1 vCPU, 1 GiB RAM).
Datasets. We validate Droplet on three datasets and
quantify the end-to-end overhead: (i) for the Fitbit activity
tracker, we use one of the co-author’s data for one year (16
data types, 130 MB). (ii) for the Ava health tracker, we use
an anonymized dataset we received from Ava (10 s intervals,
13 sensors, 1.3 GB). (iii) for the ECOviz smart meter dash-
board, we use the ECO dataset (1.85 GB) for 6 households
over a period of 8 months [16] (1 Hz accuracy).
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Figure 9: store/get performance for centralized (Vanilla: w/o Droplet, Secure: with) and decentralized storage layers. The
decentralized storage latency is dominated by network routing. For fairness, all settings, including Vanilla S3 operate on
compressed data chunks.
7.1 Micro-Benchmark
We instrument the client engine to perform the micro bench-
mark operations in isolation with up to 1000 repetitions.
Cryptographic Operations. Table 1 summarizes the costs
of the crypto operations involved in Droplet on four differ-
ent platforms. All these operations, namely AES encryption,
SHA hash, and ECDSA signature are performed once per
chunk for store requests. For data retrieval, the client does
not perform a signature verification, since AES-GCM has
built-in authentication. Running the crypto operations only
in software on the IoT devices shows the highest cost, with
3.4k encryptions/hashes per sec and only 3.7 signatures per
sec. With the onboard hardware crypto, the cost of AES and
SHA is improved by one order of magnitude and approaches
that of smartphones. Note that overall signatures are three
orders of magnitude slower than symmetric key operations.
Crypto-based Access. Hash computations are the basis
for dual key regression. The computation takes place at the
initial setup and each key update if the client chooses to re-
compute keys on-demand rather than store them. Assuming
a chain length of 9000 (hourly key updates for one year),
it takes 405 ms to compute the entire chain on smartphones
and 2.7 s on an IoT device without hardware crypto engine.
With compact hash chains, we reduce this worst case com-
pute time to 4.3 and 28.2 ms, respectively. The performance
gains become pronounced with smaller epoch intervals. The
hash tree induces O(log n) computations for n keys, which
amounts to 48 µs (laptop) with 230 keys.
The per chunk overhead consists of key computation (hash
tree and dual key regression), chunk encryption, key encryp-
tion, and signature, which amounts to 1.5 ms (laptop) with-
out caching. Compared to ABE (§4), Droplet’s crypto-based
data access is by a factor of 57x faster. E.g., with ABE per
chunk overhead with only two attributes (timestamp for tem-
poral access and data type) amounts to 86 ms (laptop).
7.2 System Performance
To model the real-world performance of Droplet, we con-
structed an end-to-end system setup, where we use our three
app datasets. Note that we do not cache any data to emulate
worst case scenarios. The stream chunk size is set to 8 KiB.
We evaluate get and store requests to the storage layer,
which include the overhead of Droplet’s access control.
Serverless Computing. In the serverless setting, Lambda
either runs Droplet for the access control or uses the
AWS Cognito service, which runs OAuth2, as the baseline.
Lambda with both Droplet and Cognito exhibits a latency of
around 118 ms (0.4% longer with Droplet). Note that with
OAuth2, to reach the same level of access granularity as with
Droplet, separate access tokens are required for each data
chunk, which is impractical. This is why in practice long-
lived and more broadly-scoped access tokens are granted.
Cloud. We extend AWS S3 storage with Droplet and com-
pare its performance against vanilla S3. Figure 9(a) shows
the throughput for different request types. We follow Ama-
zon’s guidelines to maximize throughput: for instance, the
chunk names are inherently well distributed allowing the
best performance of the underlying hash-table lookup. The
vanilla S3 throughput of 211 gets/s is within Amazon’s opti-
mal range (100-300). With Droplet, we maintain an average
rate of 204 get/s (3% drop). Figure 9(b) shows the latency for
individual store and get operations. In Droplet, the latency
overhead is 13% for get and 11% for store (incl. crypto).
Part of the overhead is due to the expensive signature opera-
tion. Also there is an overhead for a fresh lookup of access
permissions at the access control DB of the virtualchain in-
stance.
Distributed Storage We measure the performance of get
and store requests on a secure DHT with Droplet, with vary-
ing network sizes, from 16 to 1024 nodes. Figure 9(a) shows
the throughput results. As the number of nodes increases
from 16 to 1024, the performance decreases from 142 to
96 get/s. Figure 9(b) shows the latency results, divided into
routing and retrieval. The total get latency increases from
76 to 140 ms as the number of nodes grows. This is about
3 times slower than S3’s centralized storage. However, note
that this slowdown is dominated by the routing cost. After
resolving the address of the storage node with the data chunk,
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Figure 10: EccoViz app results. Retrieving records from the
energy data set in the EccoViz dashboard app (p2p storage).
the secure retrieval time is similar to that of S3. Also, note
that get requests have a lower routing overhead than store re-
quests. This is because for get requests, the routing process
is aborted as soon as a node holding the data chunk is found.
Applications. For our three applications, we measure the
overhead of store and get for different views in the app run-
ning on top of Droplet. As the storage layer, we discuss the
case of the decentralized storage setting with 1024 nodes.
Fitbit and Ava rely on a smartphone to store their data. Due
to memory constraints, data synchronization is required at
least weekly for Fitbit and daily for Ava. This results in
an average store latency of 176 ms and 1.2 s for Fitbit and
Ava, respectively. Note that store operations run in the back-
ground. For different views, the maximum get latency is be-
low 150 ms. Hence, the user experience remains unaltered.
In contrast to Fitbit and Ava, the smart meter node has di-
rect Internet connectivity. Instead of synchronizing periodi-
cally, it stores chunks after generation. This takes 176 ms per
chunk. The most comprehensive view in the ECOViz dash-
board can visualize the entire data stream. Figure 10 shows
the latency to fetch chunks dependent on the number of days
requested. Fetching data for 128 days of 6 h chunk size takes
about 10 s, whereas the one-week size takes less than 1 s.
Blockchain. In Droplet, we inherit the security and reli-
ability properties, as well as the limitations of the underly-
ing blockchain. Consequently, the performance of Droplet,
specifically with respect to access permissions updates, is
bound to that of the underlying blockchain. In our proto-
type, the transaction confirmation time is set to 15 s, similar
to that of Ethereum. The slow blockchain writes have a di-
rect impact on the time until new access permissions take ef-
fect, which is significantly higher compared to OAuth2 pro-
tocol. Read-throughput is, however, fast and comparable to
that of OAuth2. Data stream registrations and access permis-
sion adjustments (e.g., grant/revoke access) require transac-
tion writes. To scale Droplet to billions of data streams, a
blockchain throughput of few thousand transactions per sec
is necessary (i.e., assuming 25% of streams require an access
permission modification per day). While currently deployed
blockchains achieve only a fraction of this throughput (e.g.,
0.5% with Ethereum), next-generation blockchains promise
to close this gap [69]. Note that Droplet only anchors in-
directions in the blockchain (§5.1.2), as we store ACLs and
metadata off-chain, minimizing the memory impact.
7.3 Discussion & Limitations
We highlight some research questions that remain open.
Deployment. Droplet is designed to work and coexist with
several storage modalities, from cloud to emerging decen-
tralized storages [64, 98]. Droplet does not map to conven-
tional business models of IoT ecosystems today. In con-
trary, our design echoes the voice of a large body of re-
search [30,70,94,102,105,107] that calls to break the mono-
lithicity dominating today’s deployments. As long as we lack
adequate alternative economic models that facilitate horizon-
tal and modular developments, IoT apps will be developed
and deployed isolated and vertically, making it hard to fuse
data streams from a variety of sources to provide holistic and
large-scale analytics.
Beyond IoT. An authorization service with Droplet’s
properties is crucial for systems that advocate for data
sovereignty [44, 100, 107] or handle privacy-sensitive data,
e.g., sharing medical records [12], and humanitarian aid [72].
The storm of recent privacy incidents [19, 36] has prompted
a rethinking of this space. Moreover, decentralized storage
services that run on blockchain (e.g., Filecoin) can integrate
Droplet for data sharing. Services with varying trust assump-
tions can, however, run Droplet’s authorization service rather
by a federated set of servers (i.e., permissioned blockchain).
Beyond Streams. This paper addresses the challenge of
flexible and granular authorization, sharing, and accessing
of stream data in an end-to-end encrypted setting without the
need for centralized trusted entities to facilitate that. The de-
centralized authorization service and crypto-enforced access
are two key components designed to achieve this particular
goal. Our authorization is not tight to stream data and could
be coupled with other crypto access control schemes (e.g.,
ABE) for other types of data, e.g., large files.
Usability. Droplet is a user-centric system that empow-
ers data owners with control over their data. However, this
leaves several important usability considerations open. In
this design paradigm, the data owner will have to make
and manage granular decisions regarding their data. We ac-
knowledge that this is a challenge that needs to be addressed
with practical abstractions. Additionally, in an end-to-end
encryption model, protection and recovery mechanisms for
private master keys should be addressed with adequate solu-
tions. For instance, Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [93] al-
lows reconstruction of the secret from a set of recovery keys
which are, e.g., distributed among the data owner’s personal
devices [102] or a group of friends [83]. The recovery keys
can only collectively reconstruct a lost master secret key.
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8 Conclusion
To empower users with full control of their data, this pa-
per introduces Droplet, a decentralized access control sys-
tem that enables secure, selective, and flexible access con-
trol. With Droplet we present a design that marries a decen-
tralized authorization service and a novel encryption-based
access control scheme tailored for time series data. Our pro-
totype implementation and experimental results, show the
feasibility and applicability of Droplet as a decentralized au-
thorization service for end-to-end encrypted data streams.
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